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information 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Federal Republic of 
Germany, Case C-469/17, EU:C:2018:870, 25 October 2018 
 
A Member State is not a beneficiary of fundamental rights protection and cannot invoke its coypright 
to keep information confidential.  
 
Legal context / Facts 
Funke Medien is a company which owns the German daily newspaper Westdeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung. In 2012 it applied for access to all military briefings of the German Bundeswehr (Federal 
Armed Forces) between 2001 and 2012. The Bundeswehr draws up weekly reports on its deployments 
and submits these documents as confidential Parliament briefings (Unterrichtung des Parlaments, 
UdPs) to selected members of the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) and to selected ministries. The 
Bundeswehr also publishes public versions of the reports, which are summaries of UdPs as public 
briefings (Unterrichtung der Öffentlichkeit, UdÖs). Funke Medien’s request for access was denied 
because the publication of UdPs could negatively affect the security of members of the German armed 
forces. Funke Medien still gained access to a large number of UdPs and published a number of them 
on its website. The Federal Republic of German alleged infringement of copyright and requested that 
an injunction be ordered against Funke Medien. An injunction was granted in first instance and 
upheld on appeal. Before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Funke Medien seeks to 
have the injunction dismissed. The Bundesgerichtshof stayed the proceedings and referred three 
preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The questions pertain to 
the interpretation limitations and exceptions (L&Es) to the exclusive rights contained in Directive 
2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive), which harmonized certain aspects of copyright in the EU. More 
precisely, the Bundesgerichtshof ask whether EU Member States (MS) enjoy latitude when 
implementing the provisions on exclusive rights and L&Es into national law, how fundamental rights 
must be taken into consideration when interpreting L&Es and whether fundamental rights can justify 




Advocate General (AG) Szpunar delivers a very thoughtful and well-considered opinion. He begins 
his analysis by suggesting to the Court to declare the request inadmissible because the questions put 
forward by the Bundesgerichtshof are hypothetical because it has not been settled, yet, whether the 
military reports are protected subject matter. Without access to the UdPs he concludes from having 
examined the UdÖs that these do contain information, which is however presented in neutral and 
standardised terms. In Infopaq International (C-5/08), Painer (C-145/10) and BSA (C-393/09) the 
CJEU had established that a protected work must be original in order to enjoy copyright protection. It 
must be the author’s own intellectual creation, for which he made free and creative choices which 
reflect the author’s personality. A particular subject matter is not protected by copyright if the 
expression is dictated by its technical function. This, according to AG Szpunar, is the case with the 
military reports, which convey information in a standardized form. In this case the information and 
the expression become indissociable. If protection was granted to the military reports this would not 
only provide the author with a monopoly over the expression, but also over the information in the 
reports. 
Nevertheless, AG Szpunar proceeds with his opinion, in which he liberally casts aside the questions 
submitted to the CJEU, but instead focuses on the delicate relation between copyright and the right to 
freedom of expression. He notes that similar questions have also been asked in two other pending 
cases (Pelham, C-476/17 and Spiegel Online, C-516/17) which are, however, based on completely 
different sets of facts. An overly general assessment could upset the delicate balance already 
incorporated in the European copyright rules, in particular the exclusive rights and limitations and 
exceptions. This is why it is appropriate to highlight the specific facts of the case at hand and proceed 
carefully with a proportionality analysis to avoid unjustified interferences with copyright or 
fundamental rights. The Funke Medien case is of a peculiar nature because the subject matter in 
question are documents which have a purely informational character; the copyright in the documents 
is owned by the State, which can itself not be the beneficiary of fundamental rights; and the reason to 
invoke copyright is not to exploit the subject matter commercially but rather to keep the information 
contained therein confidential. To be able to give a reasonable answer, AG Szpunar then changes the 
perspective and take as the starting point of analysis the right of freedom of expression of Funke 
Medien, instead of the copyright of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Copyright law already contains elements that balance fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression with copyright, including the idea/expression dichotomy and a number of exceptions, 
which are, for the purpose of this case, exhaustively regulated in the InfoSoc Directive. However, 
there can be situations in which these mechanisms fail to provide for a proper balance. In such 
“exceptional cases” it is appropriate that copyright protection gives way to the application of 
fundamental rights or freedoms. The European Court of Human rights has already recognized such 
external limitations to copyright in principle (Ashby Donald and Others v France, Appl. nr. 36769/08 
and Frederik Neij and Peter Sunde Kiomisoppi v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12). 
AG Szpunar identifies the prevention of the disclosure of confidential information as the most 
obvious justification to limit freedom of expression. The protection of confidential information is a 
justification for limiting the rights under both, Article 11 EU Charter and Article 10(1) ECHR. But the 
protection of confidential information is not part of the subject matter of copyright, which is why it is 
necessary to find ground for limiting freedom of expression in the specific subject matter of 
copyright. An interference with the right to freedom of expression to protect a copyright could be 
justified to protect the rights of others, a justification contained in Article 10(2) ECHR and Article 
52(1) EU Charter. The ‘right of another’ in this case is the right to (intellectual) property under Article 
17(2) EU Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR. The rights of others, the AG 
continues, are right of individuals which must be guaranteed and protected by the Member States. 
Permitting a government to invoke such a right against its citizens “would be at odds with the very 
rationale behind fundamental rights” and would lead to the effective destruction of fundamental 
rights. 
But even if a State could invoke copyright to limit the freedom of expression of individuals, such 
interference must be necessary to ensure that the objectives of copyright can be realized. These 
objectives are to protect the relationship between the author and his work and to enable authors to 
exploit their works economically. First, AG Szpunar argues that military works published by a State 
might give rise to copyright, but they would not have a “real author”. The drafters of the reports are 
civil servant or members of the military who draft the reports as part of their official duties. Germany 
might be the owner of the rights in the report, but not their proper author. The special relationship 
between the author and its work can, in the case at hand, function as a justification to limit another 
fundamental right. Second, the Federal Republic of Germany attempted to use the exclusive rights 
granted by copyright to keep information confidential. This is not one of the objectives of copyright 
law and should therefore be pursued by procedures established for that particular purpose. The 
German Government had already admitted during the hearing that it did not consider an interference 
with the right to freedom of expression justified by the interest to protect the confidentiality of the 
documents. As a result, AG Szpunar concludes that the protection of confidential information does 




It is always difficult to assess the practical significane of an Advocate General’s Opinion before the 
CJEU hands down its judgment. But the arguments provided by Maciej Szpunar merit closer scrutiny, 
certainly beyond the scope of this brief report. 
A global assessment of the balance between copyright and freedom of expression is difficult, if not 
impossible to make, and moreover inappropriate. The balance between both rights must be struck on a 
case-by-case basis. There is, however, an assumption that the copyright rules amply reflect such a 
balance, which means that the balance must be sought primarily by interpreting these rules. Only in 
exceptional cases can freedom of expression, and potentially other fundamental rights, be used to 
overcome excessively disproportionate outcomes that are the result of an application of copyright 
rules. The opinion also cautions against overly creative use of arguments based on fundamental rights 
that could disturb the balance reflected in the copyright rules and which would threaten their 
legitimacy und create legal uncertainty. 
Beyond these more general observations, AG Szpunar highlights the limited justifications for 
copyright and how these function in a proportionality analysis. The use of copyright in pursuit of an 
objective other than those covered by the specific subject matter of copyright will not carry far in a 
balancing of rights. Similar to freedom of expression, copyright also has a ratio and it find its limits 
when its is employed abusively to unduly restrict or injure the rights of others. 
In the current political debate on copyright reform this is a refreshing contribution which shows that 
copyright is not the most important thing in the world but serves very specific purposes. This is a very 
modest and reasonable view of copyright as an intellectual property right that finds its effective limits 
in its specific subject matter. It is, after all, the perspective from which the balance between copyright 
and freedom of expression is examined that might determine the outcome in this case and those that 
will follow. 
 
 
